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1 Introduction
The seminal work of Artzner et al. (1999) on coherent risk measures is focused primarily
on supervisory applications. Specific examples discussed in the paper concern the rules
for capital adequacy in the 1996 Amendment to the 1988 Basel Accord, and the margin
rules of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
The axioms for acceptability that were put forward by Artzner et al. differ from the ones
that have been used traditionally in statistical decision theory. Yet it is clear that the
regulatory issues can be formulated as decision problems, and moreover there are many
other situations where both the classical axioms of decision theory and the coherence axioms
adopted by Artzner et al. can be taken into consideration. One may for instance think of
capital budgeting decisions, the determination of premia for insurance contracts, and the
pricing of derivatives in incomplete markets.
The coherence axioms in Artzner et al. (1999) lead to acceptability measures of the form
(1.1) φ(X) = inf
P∈P
EPX
where X is a function from a (finite) set Ω to R, and P is a class of probability measures
on Ω.1 One may compare (1.1) to the criterion obtained by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
from a set of decision-theoretic axioms. The Gilboa-Schmeidler criterion corresponds to a
utility specification of the form
(1.2) U(X) = inf
P∈P
EP[u(X)]
where X and P are defined as above, and where u(·) is a utility function. The interpretation
given by Gilboa and Schmeidler to the class of probability measures P, and which their axiom
system is designed to reflect, is that this class represents ambiguity in the sense of Ellsberg
(1961). There is no explicit appeal to ambiguity in Artzner et al. (1999). The suggested
interpretation of the class P in this paper is just that it represents a set of (generalized)
scenarios to be used in risk assessment.
Depending on one’s perspective, the Gilboa-Schmeidler robust expected utility frame-
work might be described as “richer” or as “more complicated” than the coherence framework
of Artzner et al. (1999). Of course, in view of the many different situations to which sta-
tistical decision theory applies, it would be pointless to argue a preference for either of the
1Actually the paper Artzner et al. (1999) uses risk measures rather than acceptability measures. We
changed the terminology here to facilitate comparison with common formulations in decision theory, and
also to stress the applicability of the same notion in different contexts. The difference between the risk
measures ρ(X) of Artzner et al. (1999) and the acceptability measures φ(X) used here is just a change of
sign (φ(X) = −ρ(X)). For simplicity reasons we ignore discounting. Artzner et al. (2003) use the term “risk
adjusted values” for what we call acceptability measures.
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two frameworks over the whole range of applications; we come back below to a discussion
of specific circumstances in which the coherence axioms may be reasonable. From a purely
technical point of view, the coherence framework offers substantial simplifications with re-
spect to the robust expected utility framework. In fact, the decision problem in Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) is formulated in terms of the randomization device that was introduced
by Anscombe and Aumann (1963) to simplify Savage’s (1954) axiomatization of subjective
expected utility. Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2000) succeeded in obtaining a derivation of the
Gilboa-Schmeidler utility specification without making use of Anscombe-Aumann lotteries.
Compared to the long proofs in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Casadesus-Masanell et
al. (2000), the coherence criterion (1.1) can be obtained in a relatively straightforward way
from standard results on the representation of convex sets. As noted in Artzner et al. (1999),
this was in fact already done by Huber (1981) in the context of robust statistics.
Several proposals have been made in recent years that aim at expressing ambiguity
aversion in a continuous-time environment. A “robust control” framework that penalizes
deviations from a reference measure has been developed for this purpose by Hansen, Sargent,
and co-authors; see for instance Hansen and Sargent (2001), Hansen et al. (2001). Chen
and Epstein (2002) have formulated a continuous-time multiple-priors utility specification,
following the recursive multiple-prior specification for discrete-time decision problems of
Epstein and Wang (1994). The Hansen-Sargent framework has been adapted for applications
in portfolio choice by Maenhout (2004), and this adaptation was extended further by Uppal
and Wang (2003). While these adaptations certainly add to the tractability of the resulting
optimization problems, they lead to difficulties in interpretation and it has been questioned
by Pathak (2002) whether the original robustness motivation is still valid under Maenhout’s
transformation. The robust control framework can be linked to the stochastic differential
utility of Duffie and Epstein (1992); see Maenhout (2004), Hansen et al. (2001), and Skiadas
(2003). None of the various proposals for continuous-time versions of the Gilboa-Schmeidler
specification has been supplied with an axiomatic foundation. However, axiom systems that
support discrete-time recursive multiple-priors utility have been proposed recently by Wang
(2003) and by Epstein and Schneider (2003).
In this paper we consider an axiom scheme that supports an extension of coherent ac-
ceptability measures to a multiperiod setting. As in Wang (2003) and Epstein and Schneider
(2003), we limit ourselves to a finite-state setting (tree models). To the axioms of Artzner
et al. (1999), we add an axiom of dynamic consistency which is similar to, although not
quite the same as, the axioms of the same name that are used by Wang and by Epstein and
Schneider. Roughly the axiom says that, if a position is acceptable at the next time instant
under all possible scenarios, then this position is also acceptable now. We obtain a repre-
sentation theorem for multiperiod acceptability measures that extends the atemporal result
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in Artzner et al. (1999). Similar representation theorems have been obtained independently
by Artzner et al. (2003) and by Riedel (2003).
As is not surprising, both the formulation of the axiom systems and the proof of the
representation theorem are considerably simpler in the multiperiod coherence framework
than in the multiperiod Gilboa-Schmeidler framework. One may of course ask whether
there are important applications in which the axioms of coherent acceptability measures
can be viewed as reasonably applicable. In addition to the regulatory applications considered
in Artzner et al. (1999), we would like to mention here the problem of derivative pricing
in incomplete markets. In particular, we focus attention on markets that are incomplete
due to the presence of unhedgable risks rather than to other factors such as illiquidity,
inaccurate information, transaction costs, constraints on trading, or indivisibility of assets.
As argued by Carr et al. (2001) in an atemporal setting, coherent acceptability measures may
be applied to obtain price bounds for derivative assets in such markets. In particular the
positive homogeneity axiom,2 which is debatable in the case of individual decision-making,
can be seen as justified in the incomplete-market context because risks can be split over
many market participants. The pricing of derivative assets in incomplete markets is in fact
our main background motivation in this paper.
In addition to the axiomatics and the representation theorem, we consider in this paper
also some issues related to the use of coherent acceptability measures. As noted above,
acceptability measures can be employed to obtain price bounds for derivatives in incomplete
markets. This follows a line of reasoning which has been employed by several authors,
who have argued that price bounds for derivative assets in incomplete markets obtained
from strict arbitrage arguments (“superreplication”) are often too wide to be practically
useful, and that tighter limits (“good-deal bounds”) can be obtained from the use of suitable
measures of acceptability. Examples include Cochrane and Saa´ Requejo (2000), Bernardo
and Ledoit (2000), Jaschke and Ku¨chler (2001), Cˇerny´ and Hodges (2002). An alternative
approach to pricing in incomplete markets can be based on calibration of a family of risk-
neutral processes to option prices; see for instance Hull and White (1990), Heston (1993),
Madan et al. (1998).
The “good-deal” approach to pricing in incomplete markets does not require by itself that
the acceptability measure used should be coherent, and not all authors work with coherent
measures; for instance Cochrane and Saa´ Requejo (2000) use the Sharpe ratio. However,
coherent acceptability measures do have a special relevance in that they create a direct link
between the “good-deal” approach and the method based on calibration. Indeed, it has
been shown by Carr et al. (2001) that absence of strictly acceptable opportunities, where
2The axiom of positive homogeneity states that the degree of acceptability of a position is proportional
to its size; see Section 2.1 below.
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acceptability is defined in terms of a given coherent measure, implies that the pricing mea-
sure must be a nontrivial convex combination of the test measures used in the specification
of the given acceptability measure. In this paper, we show that, under the dynamic consis-
tency axiom, this result carries over to the multiperiod context. In other words, calibration
over martingale measures can be restricted to the convex combinations of the probability
measures that are used to define the acceptability measure. Therefore, if for a given market
one finds a specification of an acceptability measure that is successful in that the bounds
that it produces are confirmed by the data, then the collection of probability measures that
is used in this specification is also a good candidate to serve as the basis of a calibration
exercise aiming at obtaining more precise price estimates.
A third issue to be discussed in this paper concerns tractability. A key aspect of multi-
period models is the possibility of dynamic hedging, and more generally it is of interest to
compute portfolio strategies that are optimal with respect to a given acceptability measure.
Papers that consider optimal portfolio strategies for multiple-priors utility specifications in
continuous time include Cvitanic´ and Karatzas (1999), Uppal and Wang (2003), and Kirch
(2003). In the multiperiod setting of this paper, we show that dynamic consistency implies
the existence of a recursive algorithm for the computation of optimal strategies.
The dynamic consistency axiom leads to a property of the representing collection of
probability measures which we call the “product property.”3 This property essentially means
that the collections of probability measures that are used as test measures for a given
acceptability measure must be constructed as products (in a suitable sense) of collections of
single-period measures. The property simplifies specification considerably.
An aspect that we do not consider in this paper is learning. Neglect of this aspect may
be viewed as defendable for instance in a world that is nonstationary on a long timescale and
in which agents have already learned essentially everything that can be learned given the
limits of inference. Of course, in other situations it can be important to consider learning;
see Wang (2003) for a discussion in the multiperiod Gilboa-Schmeidler framework.
Several recent papers including Cvitanicc´ and Karatzas (1999) and Frittelli and Scandolo
(2004) have considered risk measures that are “dynamic” in the sense that they refer to the
acceptability of streams of payments rather than single payoffs, but not in the sense that
the risk measure itself is a process. Artzner et al. (2003) take both aspects into account. In
this paper we consider only payoffs at the final time, so our acceptability measures are only
dynamic in the sense that they are defined as processes. One may incorporate intermediate
cashflows by assuming that these are invested in a riskless asset that pays out at the final
time; in this way any payment that is received at a non-final node is added to the payoff
3Terminology differs across papers: Epstein and Schneider (2003) use the term “rectangular”, Artzner et
al. (2003) speak of “multiplicative stability”, and Riedel (2003) just uses “consistency.”
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at all corresponding final nodes. In general such an assumption is somewhat arbitrary and
may not be justified. However, in many cases it may be reasonable to assume that there is
freedom in portfolio rebalancings so that any investments in riskless assets can be undone.
With this proviso, intermediate payments can be easily incorporated in the setting of the
present paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider the axiomatics, and prove
the representation theorem. We then turn to pricing in incomplete markets and to optimal
hedging in Section 3. The validity of the dynamic consistency axiom is discussed in Section
4, and conclusions follow in Section 5. Some of the technical proofs have been collected in
an Appendix.
Throughout the paper we take the unit of accounting to be a suitably chosen nume´raire.
In this way the complexity of the notation is somewhat reduced; in particular there is no
explicit mention of interest rates.
2 Axiomatics and the representation theorem
2.1 Single-period setting
Here we briefly review the axiomatic setting for risk measures that was proposed by Artzner
et al. (1999), with some (simple) modifications: acceptability measures are used instead of
risk measures, and we do not consider discounting. Let Ω be a finite set, say with n elements.
The set of all functions from Ω to R will be denoted by X (Ω) (' Rn). An element X of
X (Ω) is thought of as a representation of the position that generates outcome X(ω) when
the state ω ∈ Ω arises. An acceptability measure defined on Ω is a mapping from X (Ω) to R.
The number φ(X) that is associated to the position X ∈ X (Ω) by an acceptability measure
φ is interpreted as the “degree of acceptability” of the position X. An acceptability measure
is said to be coherent if it satisfies the following four axioms, where 11 : Ω→ R is defined by
11(ω) = 1 for all ω:
• translation property: φ(X + η11) = φ(X) + η for all η ∈ R
• superadditivity: φ(X1 +X2) ≥ φ(X1) + φ(X2)
• positive homogeneity: φ(λX) = λφ(X) for all λ ≥ 0
• monotonicity: X ≥ Y implies φ(X) ≥ φ(Y ).
Here we write X ≥ Y if X(ω) ≥ Y (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. A general motivation of the above
principles is provided by Artzner et al. (1999).
The following result is fundamental.
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Theorem 2.1 (Artzner et al. (1999, Prop. 4.1); Huber (1981, Prop. 10.2.1)) An
acceptability measure φ defined on a finite set Ω is coherent if and only if there exists a family
P of probability measures on Ω such that, for all X ∈ X (Ω),
(2.1) φ(X) = inf
P∈P
EPX.
If an acceptability measure φ satisfies (2.1), it is said to be represented by the family P
of probability measures, and the probability measures in the collection P are sometimes
referred to as “test measures” for φ. The above theorem can be generalized to the case of
infinite sample spaces Ω if either the representation by probability measures is replaced by
a representation in terms of finitely additive measures, or a continuity property is added to
the coherence axioms (see Delbaen (2002), Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002a-c)).
If φ is a coherent acceptability measure, then φ(η11) = η for all η ∈ R; this follows
from the axiom of positive homogeneity (which implies φ(0) = 0) and from the translation
property. For convenience we introduce a separate term for this property.
Definition 2.2 An acceptability measure φ on a sample space Ω is said to be normalized
if φ(η11) = η for all η ∈ R.
In particular, if the set Ω consists of only one element ω, then the only normalized accept-
ability measure is φ(X) = X(ω). The case in which all uncertainty has been resolved will
be used below in the multiperiod context as a starting point for backward recursions.
2.2 Multiperiod setting
We now pass to a multiperiod setting. To keep the context as simple as possible we still
work with a finite sample space Ω (following Artzner et al. (1999) and Carr et al. (2001)),
but we consider each sample now as a discrete-time trajectory. We begin with introducing
some notation and terminology that will be needed below.
2.2.1 Notation and conventions
Let T be a positive integer indicating the number of time periods over which we consider
our economy. Let A be a finite set which we shall refer to as the “event set.”4 Define Ω
as the set of all sequences (α1, . . . , αT ) with αi ∈ A; we refer to such sequences as “full
histories.” The collection of sequences (α1, . . . , ατ ) of length τ (1 ≤ τ ≤ T ) will be denoted
by Ωτ . We write Ω′τ := ∪1≤t≤τΩτ for the set of all sequences of length at most τ . The
4This terminology is appropriate in particular for tree models; for instance in binomial models the event
set consists of two elements (“up” and “down”). The framework that we use below applies equally well
however to models obtained from discretization of a continuous state space, where A would rather be
thought of as a representation of a grid in the state space.
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collection Ω′T is also written simply as Ω
′, and we write Ω′′ := Ω′T−1. Elements of both
Ω′ and Ω′′ will be referred to as “partial histories”, where the term “partial” should be
interpreted in a non-strict sense in the case of Ω′ and in a strict sense in the case of Ω′′.5
The length of a sequence ω′ ∈ Ω′ is denoted by τ(ω′). The set Ω0 of sequences of zero length
consists of a single element that we denote by 0; this element represents the initial state
of the economy. For ω = (α1, . . . , αT ) ∈ Ω and 1 ≤ τ ≤ T , define the τ -restriction ω|τ as
(α1, . . . , ατ ). If a sequence ω′ = (α1, . . . , ατ ) is a prefix of ω ∈ Ω (i.e. ω′ = ω|τ ), we write
ω′  ω. The collection of all sequences beginning with a given sequence ω′ is denoted by
F (ω′) := {ω ∈ Ω |ω′  ω}. We denote by Fτ the algebra generated by the sets F (ω′) with
ω′ in the set Ωτ of sequences of length exactly τ ; in the present setting in which we have a
finite sample space, this is of course the same as the σ-algebra generated by these sets. The
collection FT is the set of all subsets of Ω. The concatenation of a sequence ω′ = (α1, . . . , ατ )
with an element α ∈ A is the sequence (α1, . . . , ατ , α), which we write simply as ω′α. In
this paper, we adopt the conventions inf ∅ = min ∅ =∞ and 0 · ∞ = 0/0 = 0.
2.2.2 Multiperiod acceptability measures
Consider a sequence space Ω as defined in the previous subsection. In the multiperiod
setting, the acceptability of a given position should be considered not only as a function of
the position itself, but also as a function of available information.
We still define a “position” as a mapping X from Ω to R. Such a mapping may be
restricted to the set F (ω′) consisting of all sequences beginning with ω′. The restricted
mapping X|F (ω′) defines a position on F (ω′). We extend slightly the definition by accept-
ability measures that was given before by allowing that the degree of acceptability of a given
position can be ∞. So, an acceptability measure on F (ω′) is a mapping from F (ω′) to the
extended real line R ∪ {∞}.
Definition 2.3 A multiperiod acceptability measure on the sequence space Ω is a mapping
that assigns to each partial history ω′ ∈ Ω′ an acceptability measure on F (ω′).
The acceptability measure on F (ω′) that is provided by a multiperiod acceptability measure
φ will be denoted by φ(· |ω′); the element of the extended real line associated by this
mapping to a position X on F (ω′) is denoted by φ(X |ω′). When X is a position on Ω, we
also write φ(X |ω′) instead of φ(X|F (ω′) |ω′). The situation at the initial time is represented
by the sequence of zero length; instead of φ(X | 0), we write φ(X). Under the normalization
condition (Def. 2.2), we have φ(X |ω) = X(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
5In the context of a non-recombining tree model, there is a one-one relation between the elements of Ω′
and the nodes of the tree. The elements of Ω correspond to final nodes, and those of Ω′′ to pre-final nodes.
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We say that a multiperiod acceptability measure is coherent if all partial-information
acceptability measures φ(· |ω′) are coherent on F (ω′). This implies in particular that, for
all positions X and Y and for all partial histories ω′, the following holds:
(2.2) if φ(X |ω) ≥ φ(Y |ω) for all ω  ω′, then φ(X |ω′) ≥ φ(Y |ω′).
We shall say that a multiperiod acceptability measure satisfies the stepwise monotonicity
condition if the following condition holds for all positionsX and Y and for all partial histories
ω′ ∈ Ω′′:
(2.3) if φ(X |ω′α) ≥ φ(Y |ω′α) for all α ∈ A, then φ(X |ω′) ≥ φ(Y |ω′).
The example below shows that there exists situations in which the monotonicity property
(2.2) is satisfied but the stepwise monotonicity property (2.3) does not hold.
Example 2.4 Consider a two-period binomial tree; that is, let A = {u, d} and Ω =
{uu, ud, du, dd}. Specify an acceptability measure for products on Ω by
(2.4) φ(X |ω′) = min
i=1,2
(EPi [X |ω′])
where P1 is the probability measure that is obtained by assigning probability 0.6 to a u
event and 0.4 to a d event, and P2 is obtained by reversing these probabilities. Clearly, φ is
a coherent multiperiod acceptability measure. Consider a position X that pays 100 if ud or
du occurs, and that pays nothing otherwise (a “butterfly”). As is easily computed, we have
φ(X) = 48 whereas φ(X |u) = φ(X | d) = 40. Comparing the position X to the position Y
that pays 44 in all states of nature, we see that φ is not stepwise monotonic.
Several authors including Wang (2003) and Epstein and Schneider (2003) use the term
“dynamic consistency” for essentially the property that we refer to here as stepwise mono-
tonicity. We prefer to define the notion of dynamic consistency on the basis of a stronger
premise, which may make this property easier to establish in some cases. As we show below,
the notions of stepwise monotonicity and dynamic consistency (in our sense) are actually
the same under the coherence assumption.
Definition 2.5 A multiperiod acceptability measure φ defined on a sequence space Ω is
said to be dynamically consistent if for all partial histories ω′ ∈ Ω′′ and all positions X and
Y we have
(2.5) if φ(X |ω′α) = φ(Y |ω′α) for all α ∈ A, then φ(X |ω′) = φ(Y |ω′).
Proposition 2.6 A coherent multiperiod acceptability measure is dynamically consistent
if and only if it is stepwise monotonic.
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Proof It is immediate that stepwise monotonicity implies dynamic consistency, even with-
out the coherence assumption. To show the converse, let φ be a coherent and dynamically
consistent acceptability measure, and suppose that the positions X and Y and the partial
history ω′ ∈ Ω′′ are such that φ(X |ω′α) ≥ φ(Y |ω′α) for all α ∈ A. Define a position
X˜ on F (ω′) by X˜(ω) = φ(X |ω′α) if ω  ω′α, and define Y˜ similarly. Because φ(· |ω′α)
is normalized, we have φ(X˜ |ω′α) = φ(X |ω′α) for all α ∈ A, and therefore, by dynamic
consistency, φ(X˜ |ω′) = φ(X |ω′). In the same way, it follows that φ(Y˜ |ω′) = φ(Y |ω′).
Moreover, we have X˜(ω) ≥ Y˜ (ω) for all ω  ω′, which shows, by the monotonicity property
of φ(· |ω′), that φ(X˜ |ω′) ≥ φ(Y˜ |ω′). It follows that φ(X |ω′) ≥ φ(Y |ω′). 
We introduce some further notation and terminology that will be needed below. To each
ω′ ∈ Ω′′, one can associate a single-period economy in which the events that may occur
(equivalently, the states of nature that may arise after one time step) are parametrized
by the event set A. A single-period position is a mapping from A to R. A single-period
acceptability measure assigns real numbers to single-period positions.
Let a multiperiod acceptability measure φ be given. For any partial history ω′ ∈ Ω′′,
one can generate a position XY on F (ω′) from a given single-period position Y : A→ R by
defining
(2.6) XY (ω) = Y (α) if ω  ω′α.
In this way we can introduce for each ω′ ∈ Ω′′ a single-period acceptability measure denoted
by φω′ :
(2.7) φω′ : Y 7→ φ(XY |ω′).
The following lemma is easily verified directly from the coherence axioms.
Lemma 2.7 If φ is a coherent multiperiod acceptability measure, then all single-period
acceptability measures φω′ derived from φ are coherent as well.
Given a product X on the sequence space Ω and a multiperiod acceptability measure
φ, we can define for each partial history a single-period position φ(X |ω′·) in the following
way:
(2.8) φ(X |ω′·) : α 7→ φ(X |ω′α).
Since this is a single-period position, its acceptability may be evaluated by means of the
single-period acceptability measure φω′ . If φ is dynamically consistent, we have
(2.9) φ(X |ω′) = φω′(φ(X |ω′·)).
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This implies that the multiperiod acceptability measure φ can be described in terms of the
conditional single-period acceptability measures φω′ .
An obvious way to construct a dynamically consistent acceptability measure is to start
by assigning a single-period acceptability measure φω
′
to each partial history ω′ ∈ Ω′′ (for
instance one may use the same acceptability measure for each ω′) and then to define φ(· |ω′)
recursively by
(2.10)
φ(X |ω) = X(ω) (ω ∈ Ω)
φ(X |ω′) = φω′(φ(X |ω′·)) (ω′ ∈ Ω′′).
In the following lemma we verify some properties of this scheme. Extending the terminology
introduced in Def. 2.2, we say that a multiperiod acceptability measure φ is normalized if
each measure φ(· |ω′) is a normalized acceptability measure on F (ω′).
Lemma 2.8 The acceptability measure φ that is defined on the sequence space Ω from a
family {φω′}ω′∈Ω′′ via the rule (2.10) is normalized if all measures φω′ are normalized, and
in this case we have φω′ = φω
′
for all ω′. Moreover, if all φω
′
are coherent, then φ is coherent
as well.
Proof The first claim follows easily by induction. To show that φω′ = φω
′
, take a single-
period position Y : A → R, and let XY be defined as in (2.6). Due to the normalization
property we have φ(XY |ω′α) = Y (α) for all α ∈ A, and so
φω′(Y ) = φ(XY |ω′) = φω′(φ(XY |ω′·)) = φω′(Y ).
Since this holds for all Y , it follows that φω′ = φω
′
. Finally, the fact that coherence of φ
follows from coherence of all φω
′
can be verified by induction directly from the coherence
axioms. 
It follows from the lemma that any dynamically consistent acceptability measure can be
thought of as having been constructed from single-period acceptability measures by means
of the rule (2.10). For coherent risk measures, we can ask what this means in terms of the
representing collection of probability measures. This question is answered below.
2.2.3 Representation by collections of probability measures
A probability measure P on (Ω,FT ) can be defined in a straightforward way by assigning a
probability to each trajectory ω. With slight abuse of notation, we denote the probability
that ω will occur by P(ω). The marginal probability of a sequence ω′ ∈ Ω′ is given, with
some further abuse of notation, by
(2.11) P(ω′) =
∑
ω′ω
P(ω) = P(F (ω′)).
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The conditional probability given a sequence ω′ ∈ Ω′ of a sequence ω  ω′ is given by
(2.12) P(ω |ω′) = P(ω)
P(ω′)
.
We will also need the “single-period conditional probabilities” defined by
(2.13) Ps(α |ω′) = P(ω
′α)
P(ω′)
.
For future reference we note the decomposition with respect to single-step marginals
(2.14) P(ω |ω′) = Ps(α |ω′)P(ω |ω′α) if ω′α  ω
and the law of iterated expectations
E[X |ω′] =
∑
ωω′
P(ω |ω′)X(ω)(2.15)
=
∑
α∈A
Ps(α |ω′)
∑
ωω′α
P(ω |ω′α)X(ω)
= EPs(· |ω′)E[X |ω′α].
Given a collection P of probability measures on Ω, we can define a multiperiod accept-
ability measure φP by defining
(2.16) φP(X |ω′) = inf
P∈P, P(ω′)>0
EP[X |ω′]
for positions X and partial histories ω′. To avoid having to deal with trivial exceptions
we introduce as a standing assumption that risk measures satisfy an axiom of relevance (cf.
Artzner et al. (1999; p. 210) and Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002c, p. 347)).
Assumption 2.9 If φ denotes a multiperiod acceptability measure, then, for all ω′ ∈ Ω′,
(2.17) X ≤ 0 and X 6= 0 implies φ(X |ω′) < 0.
In other words, we assume that in (2.16) the union of supports of measures in P equals Ω.6
It is easily seen that a coherent acceptability measure is representable in the form (2.16)
if and only if the positions X that are acceptable given a partial history ω′ are exactly those
for which the position X · 11F (ω′) is acceptable at the initial time. Clearly, a multiperiod
acceptability measure need not satisfy this property even if it is coherent, since our general
definition implies no relations between the conditional acceptability measures related to
different partial histories. Multiperiod acceptability measures of the form (2.16) might be
6See Artzner et al. (1999; remark 4.3) for a proof. Note that finiteness of φP in (2.16) is equivalent
to a weaker form of relevance, corresponding to the condition that the union of supports of test measures
contains Ω′′.
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called completely coherent. Example 2.4 shows that a completely coherent measure is not
necessarily dynamically consistent. It will follow from Thm. 2.12 below that the reverse
implication does hold true.
If a collection P of probability measures on Ω is given, one can define for each partial
history ω′ ∈ Ω′′ a collection of single-period probability measures by
(2.18) Ps(ω′) = {Ps(· |ω′) |P ∈ P with P(ω′) > 0}
where Ps(· |ω′) is defined by (2.13). Conversely, if for each ω′ ∈ Ω′′ a collection of single-
period measures Ps(ω′) is given, then the family {Ps(ω′)}ω′∈Ω′′ defines a collection of prob-
ability measures on Ω by
(2.19) P = {P |Ps(· |ω′) ∈ Ps(ω′) for all ω′ ∈ Ω′′ s. t. P(ω′) > 0}.
If the above relation holds, we say that the collection P is generated by the family {Ps(ω′)}ω′∈Ω′′ .
In more concrete terms, the generated probability measures are of the form
(2.20) P : (α1, . . . , αT ) 7→
T∏
t=1
Pst(αt)
where for each t
Pst ∈ Ps((α1, . . . , αt−1)).
Starting with a given collection of probability measures P we can first form its associated
family of collections of single-period measures, and then form the collection P ′ of measures
generated by this family. It may well happen that the collection P ′ obtained in this way is
larger than the original collection P; see for instance Example 2.4. In the following definition
we introduce a term for collections of probability measures that do not change under the
operation just described.
Definition 2.10 A collection of probability measures P on a sequence space Ω is said to
be of product type if
(2.21) P = {P |Ps(· |ω′) ∈ Ps(ω′) for all ω′ ∈ Ω′′ s. t. P(ω′) > 0}.
Example 2.4 has shown that a multiperiod acceptability measure specified by a collection
of test measures via (2.16) is not necessarily dynamically consistent. The following lemma
will be used below to prove that dynamic consistency does hold for acceptability measures
obtained from product-type collections of probability measures.
Lemma 2.11 Let P be a product-type collection of test measures, with generating family
{Ps(ω′)}ω′∈Ω′′ , and let the associated acceptability measure be denoted by φ. For any
product X and any partial history ω′ ∈ Ω′′, we have
(2.22) φ(X |ω′) = inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EPφ(X |ω′α).
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Proof Take a partial history ω′, a position X, and a test measure P ∈ P. By the law of
iterated expectations, we have
EP[X |ω′] = EPs(· |ω′)EP[X |ω′α]
≥ EPs(· |ω′) infP∈P EP[X |ω
′α]
= EPs(· |ω′)φ(X |ω′α)
≥ inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EPφ(X |ω′α).
Since this holds for all P ∈ P, it follows that
φ(X |ω′) = inf
P∈P
EP[X |ω′] ≥ inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EPφ(X |ω′α).
To show the reverse inequality, take ε > 0 and let P ∈ Ps(ω′). Because φ(X |ω′α) =
infP∈P EP[X |ω′α], we can choose for each α a probability measure Pα ∈ P such that
EPα [X |ω′α] ≤ φ(X |ω′α) + ε.
By the assumption that the collection P is of product type, there exists a probability measure
P ∈ P such that Ps(· |ω′) = P and P(· |ω′α) = Pα(· |ω′α) for all α ∈ A. Then
EP[X |ω′] = EPs(· |ω′)EP[X |ω′α]
= EPEPα [X |ω′α]
≤ EP (φ(X |ω′α) + ε)
= EPφ(X |ω′α) + ε.
It follows that
EPφ(X |ω′α) ≥ EP[X |ω′]− ε ≥ φ(X |ω′)− ε.
Since this holds for all positive ε, we obtain EPφ(X |ω′α) ≥ φ(X |ω′), and since P ∈ Ps(ω′)
was arbitrary, it follows that
inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EPφ(X |ω′α) ≥ φ(X |ω′).
This completes the proof. 
We now show that, for coherent multiperiod acceptability measures, the properties of dy-
namic consistency and of representability by a product-type collection are in fact equivalent.
Theorem 2.12 A coherent multiperiod acceptability measure is dynamically consistent if
and only if it can be represented, via relation (2.16), by a product-type collection of proba-
bility measures.
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Proof Let a multiperiod acceptability measure φ be defined by the relation (2.16) where
the collection P is of product type. The preceding lemma shows that, for each position X
and each ω′ ∈ Ω′′, the degree of acceptability φ(X |ω′) is determined in terms of the values
of φ(X |ω′α), and it follows immediately that the acceptability measure φ is dynamically
consistent.
Conversely, let φ be a dynamically consistent and coherent acceptability measure. As
noted in Lemma 2.7, the single-period acceptability measures φω′ derived from φ are all co-
herent, and so by the representation result Thm. 2.1 there exists for each ω′ ∈ Ω′′ a collection
Ps(ω′) of probability measures on the event set A such that φω′(Y ) = infP∈Ps(ω′)EPY for
any single-period position Y . Let P denote the product-type collection of probability mea-
sures on Ω that is generated by the family {Ps(ω′)}ω′∈Ω′′ (notice that Ps(ω′) is non-empty
because of Assumption 2.9). For any position X, we have
φ(X |ω′) = φω′(φ(X |ω′·))
= inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EPφ(X |ω′α)
= φP(X |ω′)
where we used the preceding lemma in the final equality. This shows that φ is represented
by the product-type collection P. 
3 Pricing in incomplete markets
The main purpose of this section is to obtain price bounds for derivative products in incom-
plete markets. For this purpose we suppose that an acceptability measure (i.e. a collection
of test measures) has been selected in a sufficiently conservative way so that, in a straight-
forward extension of the standard arbitrage argument, any opportunity that is acceptable
according this measure would be quickly eliminated in the market. After this adjustment
has taken place, the price of any asset must be such that it is not possible to create accept-
able opportunities by means of any admissible portfolio strategy. We aim to compute the
resulting price bounds explicitly.
3.1 Absence of strictly acceptable opportunities
We assume that n basic assets are present in the market, whose prices are described by a
function S : Ω′ → Rn. For each 0 ≤ t ≤ T , an Ft-measurable function St : Ω → Rn is
defined by St(ω) = S(ω|t). A trading strategy is a function from Ω′ to Rn, interpreted as a
rule that assigns to each partial history ω′ ∈ Ω′ a position in the basic instruments. Again, if
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g : Ω′ → Rn is a strategy, we write gt(ω) = g(ω|t). Each trading strategy defines a position,
namely the total result of the strategy which is given by
(3.1) Hg :=
T−1∑
t=0
g>t (St+1 − St)
for a self-financing strategy with zero initial investment. Given a basic acceptability measure
φ, we define the acceptability measure of a position X subject to a strategy g by
(3.2) φg(X) := φ(X +Hg).
Let us assume that a nonempty set G of allowed hedging strategies has been fixed. We
can then define, for any position X, the optimal degree of acceptability taking hedging into
account:
(3.3) φ∗(X) := sup
g∈G
φg(X).
In general the supremum need not be finite. If φ∗(X) =∞ then arbitrarily high degrees of
acceptability can be achieved, which may not seem realistic at least in some interpretations
of acceptability measures. Therefore we are interested in conditions that ensure finiteness
of the supremum in (3.3).
Consider first, as in Carr et al. (2001), a single-period economy with traded assets
S0, . . . , Sn and with a collection P of probability measures on the finite set Ω of states
of nature. The price of asset i at time t (t = 0, 1) is given by Sit ; S
0 is the nume´raire which
always has price 1. The economy is said to allow strictly acceptable opportunities if it is
possible to form a strictly acceptable portfolio at zero cost; that is, if there exist portfolio
weights a0, . . . , an such that∑n
i=0 aiS
i
0 = 0
EP
∑n
i=0 aiS
i
1 ≥ 0 for all P ∈ P
EP
∑n
i=0 aiS
i
1 > 0 for some P ∈ P.
Carr et al. (2001) have argued that if a collection of test measures is chosen sufficiently large
so as to reflect a widely held market view, it can be assumed that there will be no strictly
acceptable opportunities in the economy. The NSAO condition (“no strictly acceptable
opportunities”) is a stronger requirement than absence of arbitrage7, and in incomplete
markets it therefore leads in general to tighter bounds on prices of contingent claims than
would be obtained by the no-arbitrage condition alone.
In a multiperiod setting, we interpret the NSAO condition as the requirement that no
self-financing investment strategy with zero initial cost should produce a strictly acceptable
7Notice that Assumption 2.9 guarantees that no arbitrage opportunity can be overlooked by every test.
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result. It is easily verified that a necessary condition for the NSAO condition to hold for
a given multiperiod economy is that each of the associated single-period economies should
be free of strictly acceptable opportunities. As can be seen from simple examples, however,
this condition is not sufficient.
Example 3.1 Consider the two-period binomial tree of Example 2.4 again, with the same
collection of two test measures. Suppose there are two assets S and B. The value of B is
always 100, whereas for S we have
S(0) = 100, S(u) = 110, S(d) = 90,
S(uu) = 120, S(ud) = S(du) = 100, S(dd) = 80.
It is easily verified that none of the single-period economies derived from this model allows
strictly acceptable opportunities. Now consider the dynamic strategy that is defined as
follows. Take no position at the initial time; at time 1, take a position 1 in the asset S (and
−1.1 in B) if an “up” movement occurs, and take the opposite position (and 0.9 in B) if a
“down” step takes place. The expected result of this strategy under test measure P1 is
0.6 · (0.6 · 10 + 0.4 · (−10)) + 0.4 · (0.6 · (−10) + 0.4 · 10) = 0.4
while under P2 we find
0.4 · (0.4 · 10 + 0.6 · (−10)) + 0.6 · (0.4 · (−10) + 0.6 · 10) = 0.4.
So the expected result is positive in both cases; the “momentum” strategy creates a strictly
acceptable opportunity.
In the example, the collection of test measures is not large enough to counterbalance the
flexibility of dynamic strategies. An obvious way to extend the set of test measures is to
form the product-type collection generated by the single-period probability measures that
are implied by the two original test measures; this is the procedure already suggested just
before Def. 2.10. For instance, this would generate a measure that assigns probability 0.6 to
an “up” movement in the first step but probability 0.4 to the same movement at the second
step, conditional on occurrence of an upward movement on the first step. It can easily be
seen that the set of eight probability measures obtained in this way is sufficiently large to
eliminate all strictly acceptable opportunities in the example economy.
A necessary condition for the multiperiod NSAO condition to hold is that each of the
single-period economies satisfies the NSAO property. Under the assumption of dynamic
consistency, this condition is sufficient as well, as shown in the theorem below.
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Theorem 3.2 Consider a multiperiod economy with assets S1, . . . , Sn and a collection P
of test measures. If the collection P is of product type, and if no single-period economy
allows a strictly acceptable opportunity, then the multiperiod economy allows no strictly
acceptable opportunities.
The proof of the theorem is given in the appendix. It has been shown by Carr et al.
in a single-period situation, and under the assumption that the set of test measures is
finite,8 that absence of strictly acceptable opportunities is equivalent to the existence of a
representative state pricing function which expresses the prices of Arrow-Debreu securities
as expected values under a certain linear combination, with strictly positive coefficients,
of test measures. It follows from the above result that, under dynamic consistency, this
property can be generalized to the multiperiod situation.
Remark 3.3 In Thm. 3.2, dynamic consistency is a sufficient but not a necessary condition
for absence of strictly acceptable opportunities in the multiperiod economy. It may be
verified that in Example 3.1 the NSAO condition can also be obtained by adding just one
test measure, for instance the measure P3 that assigns probabilities 0.24, 0.26, 0.26, and
0.24 to the events uu, ud, du, and dd, respectively. Product-type completion of the two
given measures leads to the addition of six test measures. So the theorem above provides a
way of guaranteeing NSAO that is systematic, but possibly conservative. Fulfillment of the
multiperiod NSAO property is already achieved by the addition of any test measures such
that there is a nontrivial convex combination of the extended collection of test measures that
produces a martingale. In the numerical example given before, note that 14P1 +
1
4P2 +
1
2P3
is a martingale measure (which is in fact unique in this example). It may also be noted that
the anomaly of Example 2.4 is not cured by the addition of the test measure P3.
3.2 Recursive Formulation of Price Bounds
Given a product X and a set of admissible hedging strategies G, the degree of acceptability
of X at time 0 under optimal hedging has been defined as
(3.4) φ∗(X) = sup
g∈G
φ(X +Hg).
In Jaschke and Ku¨chler (2001; Proposition 7), it is shown that if φ is coherent, and G is
a cone, then φ∗ is coherent as well. In this way one obtains coherent valuation bounds for
X: a price for X outside the interval [φ∗(X),−φ∗(−X)] would induce a strictly acceptable
opportunity consisting of a suitably hedged long or short position inX. We will be interested
below in obtaining recursive schemes to compute these bounds.
8Equivalently, it may be assumed that the set of test measures is finitely generated, i.e. there exists a
finite set of measures such that each test measure can be written as a convex combination of these.
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It is possible to characterize the transformed family P∗ that represents φ∗, in the sense
that φ∗P = φP∗ ; see Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002a, 2002c) for results in a more general setting.
Our main interest in this section is to obtain recursive schemes for the computation of the
optimal degree of acceptability under hedging.
For the purposes of the recursion, we define for a given hedging strategy g:
(3.5) Hgτ (ω) =
T−1∑
t=τ
g>t (ω)(St+1(ω)− St(ω)) (ω ∈ Ω).
Note that the lower limit of the summation in (3.5) is t = τ . In keeping with the standard
convention that assigns the value 0 to a sum with no terms, we set
HgT (ω) = 0
for all histories ω and all strategies g. For a given product X we define
(3.6) φg(X |ω′) = φ(X +Hgτ(ω′) |ω′)
and
(3.7) φ∗(X |ω′) = sup
g∈G
φg(X |ω′).
The following theorem provides a recursive max-min characterization of the optimal degree
of acceptability. The proof of the theorem is provided in the appendix.
Theorem 3.4 Consider an economy with asset prices Si : Ω′ → R (i = 1, . . . , n) and with
a collection P of test measures that is of product type. Let the collection P be generated
by the family {Ps(ω′)}ω′∈Ω′′ . Assume that a set of admissible hedge strategies G is given
consisting of all functions from Ω′ to G where G ⊂ Rn. For any product X and any partial
history ω′ ∈ Ω′′, we have
(3.8) φ∗(X |ω′) = sup
γ∈G
inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EP [φ∗(X |ω′α) + γ>(S(ω′α)− S(ω′))].
If for all ω′ ∈ Ω′ the supremum in (3.8) is achieved, say in γ(ω′), then the strategy g∗ defined
by
g∗ : ω′ 7→ γ(ω′) (ω′ ∈ Ω′′).
optimizes the degree of acceptability of the position X, i.e., for all ω′ ∈ Ω′,
(3.9) φ∗(X |ω′) = φg∗(X |ω′).
The theorem does not claim that there is a unique strategy that optimizes acceptability. It
may well happen that at one or more partial histories ω′ there are several different values
of γ that achieve the supremum in (3.8). In this case there are several different strategies
that reach the same optimal level of acceptability.
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In the above, we have allowed restrictions of hedging positions so that for instance short-
selling constraints can be accommodated. These restrictions could be made state-dependent
at the cost of just a bit more complex notation. If hedging positions are unrestricted,
on the other hand, then the max-min characterization can be considerably simplified. The
following implication of Proposition 20 of Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002a), which in fact does not
involve dynamic consistency at all, deserves to be made explicit in this context. A derivation
is given in the appendix. The proposition below can also be derived from the version of
the fundamental theorem of asset pricing due to Jaschke and Ku¨chler (2001, Cor. 8).
Proposition 3.5 Let P be a collection of test measures representing an acceptability mea-
sure φ for a multiperiod economy given by an asset price process S. Under the assumption of
unrestricted trading (G = Rn), the optimal acceptability measure φ∗ in (3.4) is represented
by the set P0 of all measures in the closed convex hull of P under which the price process
S is a martingale.
We hence may write φ∗P = φP0 . By combining this with Theorem 3.4, the max-min
problem in (3.8) can simplified considerably.
Corollary 3.6 Assume the setting of Prop. 3.5, with P0 of product type. Let the collection
of single-step martingale measures in Ps(ω′) be denoted by Ps0(ω′). If Ps0(ω′) is not empty,
then
(3.10) φ∗(X |ω′) = inf
P∈Ps0(ω′)
EPφ
∗(X |ω′α).
So, under unrestricted trading, optimal hedging reduces the set of test measures to the set
of its risk-neutral elements, whose evaluations are not affected by trading. If the remaining
collection of risk-neutral measures is dynamically consistent, the backward recursion in (2.22)
for acceptability can be applied in terms of price bounds. When the set Ps0(ω′) over which
minimization takes place is empty, the relation (3.10) still holds on the basis of the convention
that the minimum over an empty set is∞; in this case, the NSAO condition is not satisfied.
4 The axiom of dynamic consistency
In the literature on choice under uncertainty in multiperiod situations, dynamic consistency
appears to be widely accepted as an aspect of rational behavior. For instance, Barberis
et al. (2001) emphasize that the agents they construct are dynamically consistent. The
axiom system of Artzner et al. (1999) has inspired a number of papers on multiperiod risk
measures, including Artzner et al. (2003), Riedel (2003), Weber (2003), and Frittelli and
Rosazza Gianin (2004). In each of these contributions an axiom of dynamic consistency is
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imposed, although the precise content given to the axiom differs between papers. Cochrane
and Saa´ Requejo (2000), in their discussion of “good-deal bounds” in a multiperiod setting,
assume that the uncertainty structures in successive periods are independent of each other,
which is analogous to the product property that we have discussed here.
Epstein and Schneider (2003) adopt an axiom of dynamic consistency as well, but they
also add a discussion of the applicability of the axiom. As it is the case with all axioms
concerning decision making, it is indeed important to be aware of situations where seemingly
natural rules may be violated. Epstein and Schneider provide an example of a situation in
which a rational agent might well show time-inconsistent behavior. A key role in this example
is played by the fact that ambiguity may be increased, rather than decreased, by the arrival
of new information. Ambiguity aversion may lead an agent to avoid such situations, and this
may lead to time-inconsistencies. It has in fact already been demonstrated in the classical
work by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that human decisions tend to be sensitive to the
order in which choices are presented.
While it is difficult to summarize human decision making in a set of rules, a more
normative approach may be appropriate for decision making in financial institutions, or
for purposes of regulation. In particular it seems reasonable to exclude situations as in
Example 2.4, where a particular product is considered acceptable at price 48 whereas in
all scenarios the accepted price at the next time instant would be only 40. The axiom of
dynamic consistency does indeed prevent such situations from occurring.
The property of absence of strictly acceptable opportunities is a strengthening of the
property of absence of arbitrage. Although of course in actual markets it may happen that
strictly acceptable opportunities exist, just as arbitrage opportunities may sometimes arise,
we believe that the NSAO property is useful as a starting point for analysis. We have shown
above that the NSAO property is implied by dynamic consistency. It should be noted though
that the implication only goes one way, and that absence of strictly acceptable opportunities
may well hold in situations where the axiom of dynamic consistency as formulated above is
not satisfied, as illustrated by Example 3.1. Therefore, taking the “product closure” of a
given collection of test measures can be a rather conservative way of ensuring that NSAO
is satisfied. At this moment we are not aware however of any other systematic way of
extending a given collection of test measures that achieves compliance with NSAO in a less
conservative manner. Forming the product-type completion has the additional benefit of
removing the type of anomaly found in Example 2.4, which is not always the case with
alternative methods of achieving NSAO (cf. Remark 3.3).
Typical examples of collections of test measures that do not satisfy the product property,
and that therefore do not represent dynamically consistent acceptability measures in the
sense of this paper, are collections of measures formed on the basis of unknown-but-constant
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volatility. Such collections are formed by allowing a range of possible volatilities at each time
step, but not allowing the volatility to vary from one time step to the other. In this way
one obtains a collection of measures parametrized by a single volatility parameter. Models
of this type assume that there is a true constant volatility, but we are just uncertain as to
the exact value of this parameter. One may argue that, if such a supposition would be true,
observations from the past would already have enabled us to estimate the actual volatility
parameter to a high accuracy.
The product property expresses that the uncertainty about the whole multi-period proba-
bility measure takes the form of uncertainty about each single-period conditional probability
measure separately. A possible source of the latter uncertainty could simply be the change-
ability of the world in which we live. It is important to note that the product property does
allow this uncertainty to be state-dependent. The choice of suitable state variables provides
a way to introduce model assumptions concerning the uncertainty introduced at each step
in different situations.
Example 4.1 Consider the following stylized example with N periods and events A =
{α+, α0, α−} corresponding to relative price changes given by 1 + ε, 1, and 1 − ε, where
0 < ε < 1. Let Pq denote the one-step measure assigning probabilities (1 − q)/2, q, and
(1 − q)/2 to the events α+, α0, and α−, respectively. Uncertain volatility can be modelled
by considering test sets of the form P = {P | Ps(· |ω′) = Pq for some q ∈ I}, for a given
subinterval I = [qlow, qhigh] of [0, 1]. The modeling can be refined by making the interval I
history-dependent. For example, the interval might depend on an exponentially weighted
average of the occurrence of event α0 in the string ω′. Many alternatives are possible, at the
cost of extending the state variable; for instance I(ω′) could be made to depend on implied
volatilities that are observed in the market. In a similar way one could consider multinomial
distributions obtained from discretizing other popular models in finance, such as sets of
lognormal distributions with mean and variance ranging over state-dependent intervals in
each period.
5 Conclusions
We have considered the multiperiod extension of the notion of coherent risk measures as
introduced by Artzner et al. (1999). Our main conclusions are that the addition of a dynamic
consistency axiom leads to a simple and attractive characterization of coherent dynamic
acceptability measures, and that the framework obtained in this way allows characterizations
of price bounds for derivative assets in incomplete markets that are natural counterparts of
the well-known results for the complete market case.
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We have worked within the simplest possible setting that allows consideration of partially
revealed information and dynamic hedging. Interpreting our results from a continuous-time
perspective, one might say that the product property would favor approaches that measure
discrepancy between models in terms of an entropy rate, such as Pathak (2002), Trojani
and Vanini (2002), and Sbuelz and Trojani (2002), above approaches that work with total
relative entropy as a distance measure.9 In the absence of axiomatic underpinnings of
continuous-time utility specifications, however, it remains difficult to make any definitive
statements. Steps towards axiomatization of the coherent framework in a continuous-time
setting have been taken by Delbaen (2003).
In this paper we have worked with the axiom of positive homogeneity, following Artzner
et al. (1999). In some applications, such as portfolio optimization, this axiom may not be
attractive. To accommodate these situations, the framework of Artzner et al. (1999) can be
extended by adding a function that associates to each test measure a corresponding “floor”;
cf. Carr et al. (2001), Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002a-c). It has been shown that this extension
corresponds to replacing the homogeneity axiom of Artzner et al. (1999) by a convexity
axiom, and that, under suitable continuity assumptions, the representation (1.2) of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989) can be obtained from the thus modified axiom scheme, even though
this scheme is different from the one used by Gilboa and Schmeidler (Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2002a, Thm. 5, Cor. 14)). Naturally it would be of interest to extend these results to the
intertemporal setting; this may lead to alternative axiomatic foundations for the dynamic
Gilboa-Schmeidler specifications of Wang (2003) and Epstein and Schneider (2003).
For applications to pricing in incomplete markets, a key challenge is to find robust utility
specifications that are (i) tractable, (ii) stable in the sense that calibrated parameters do
not vary erratically over time, and (iii) successful in the sense that price bounds for exotic
derivatives are tight and in conformity with market practice. The development of this paper
suggests certain forms of such specifications and certain properties that may be considered
attractive. However, this is of course still a long way from providing concrete specifications
that are suitable for particular markets, and much exploratory work in this direction remains
to be done.
6 Appendix
Proof of Thm. 3.2
We need the following definition.
9See for instance Ma¨kila¨ et al. (1999) and the references therein for analogous developments in control
theory.
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Definition 6.1 A set of vectors {x1, . . . , xk} ⊂ Rn is said to be positively complete if there
exists no vector g ∈ Rn such that g>xi ≥ 0 for all i and g>xi > 0 for some i.
An equivalent formulation is that the nonnegative cone generated by the vectors xi is the
same as the linear span of these vectors; this motivates our terminology. If for each i =
1, . . . , N we have a set Xi of vectors in Rni , we can form the product set X = X1×· · ·×XN
which is defined by
(6.1) X := {

x1
...
xN
 |x1 ∈ X1, . . . , xN ∈ XN} ⊂ Rn
where n = n1+ · · ·+ nN . For instance, the product of a set of three vectors in R2 and a set
of four vectors in R3 is a set of twelve vectors in R5. We can now formulate the following
lemma.
Lemma 6.2 A product of positively complete sets is again positively complete.
Proof For i = 1, . . . , N , let Xi denote a set of ki vectors in Rni , and suppose that each set
Xi is positively complete. Suppose (g1, . . . , gN ) ∈ Rn1 × · · · × RnN is such that
N∑
i=1
g>i xi ≥ 0
for all (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X1 × · · · ×XN . We have to show that these conditions imply that
N∑
i=1
g>i xi = 0
for all (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X1×· · ·×XN . Take a fixed sequence (x2, . . . , xN ) in X2×· · ·XN , and
let X1 consist of the vectors x11, . . . , x
1
k1
. By Stiemke’s lemma (see for instance Mangasarian
(1969), p. 32), there exist positive numbers α1, . . . , αk1 such that α1x
1
1 + · · · + αk1x1k1 = 0.
It follows that
0 ≤
k1∑
j=1
αj(g>1 x
1
j +
N∑
i=2
g>i xi) =
k1∑
j=1
αj ·
N∑
i=2
g>i xi
so that in particular
N∑
i=2
g>i xi ≥ 0.
Since x2, . . . , xN were chosen arbitrarily, it follows that the above relation holds for all
collections (x2, . . . , xN ). The reasoning can be repeated to show that
∑N
i=3 g
>
i xi ≥ 0 for all
collections (x3, . . . , xN ). Continuing in this way, we finally find g>NxN ≥ 0 for all xN ∈ XN .
By the assumption in the lemma, it follows that actually we must have g>NxN = 0 for all
xN . Repeating the same exercise for a different order of the indices, we find for all i that
g>i xi = 0 for all xi ∈ Xi. The claim of the lemma follows. 
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Proof (of Thm. 3.2) Suppose that the condition of the theorem holds and let g be a trading
strategy such that EPHg ≥ 0 for all P ∈ P; we then have to show that in fact EPHg = 0 for
all P ∈ P. To see this, note that we may write
EPH
g =
∑
ω∈Ω
P(ω)
[
T−1∑
t=0
g>t (ω)(St+1(ω)− St(ω))
]
=
∑
ω∈Ω
P(ω)
 ∑
ω′αω
g>(ω′)(S(ω′α)− S(ω′))

=
∑
ω′∈Ω′′
g>(ω′)
∑
α∈A
P(ω′α)[S(ω′α)− S(ω′)].
Lemma 6.2 applies with the collections of vectors {∑α∈A P(ω′α)[S(ω′α) − S(ω′)] |P ∈ P}
playing the role of the collections Xi, and the set of partial trajectories Ω′′ playing the role
of the index set {1, . . . , N}. The statement in the theorem follows in this way from the
assumption on the single-period economies. 
Proof of Thm. 3.4
Take a product X and a partial history ω′; let τ = τ(ω′). To show that the left hand side
of (3.8) is at most equal to the right hand side, take a strategy g ∈ G. We have:
φg(X |ω′) = φ(X +Hgτ |ω′)
= inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EPφ(X +Hgτ |ω′α)
= inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EPφ(X +H
g
τ+1 + g(ω
′)>(S(ω′α)− S(ω′)) |ω′α)
= inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EP [φ(X +H
g
τ+1 |ω′α) + g(ω′)>(S(ω′α)− S(ω′))]
≤ inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EP [φ∗(X |ω′α) + g(ω′)>(S(ω′α)− S(ω′))]
≤ sup
γ∈G
inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EP [φ∗(X |ω′α) + γ>(S(ω′α)− S(ω′))].
Since this holds for every g ∈ G, we find
φg(X |ω′) ≤ sup
γ∈G
inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EP [φ∗(X |ω′α) + γ>(S(ω′α)− S(ω′))]
which completes the first part of the proof. To show the reverse inequality, take γ ∈ G and
ε > 0, and let g be a strategy such that
φg(X |ω′α) ≥ φ∗(X |ω′α)− ε
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and g(ω′) = γ. We have
φ∗(X |ω′) ≥ φg(X |ω′)
= inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EP [φg(X |ω′α) + γ>(S(ω′α)− S(ω′))]
≥ inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EP [φ∗(X |ω′α) + γ>(S(ω′α)− S(ω′))]− ε.
Since this holds for every γ ∈ G and every ε > 0, we can take supremum with respect to
both γ and ε and obtain
φ∗(X |ω′) ≥ sup
γ∈G
inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EP [φ∗(X |ω′α) + γ>(S(ω′α)− S(ω′))]
as required.
Concerning the second statement, take a strategy g ∈ G and a product X : Ω→ R. The
proof proceeds by induction with respect to the difference of final time and current time.
For complete histories ω ∈ Ω, the normalization property implies that φg(X |ω) = X(ω) for
all strategies g and so the condition (3.9) is trivially satisfied. Now assume that (3.9) holds
for all partial histories of length τ + 1, and let ω′ be a sequence of length τ . Then we can
write:
φg(X |ω′) = φ(X +Hgτ |ω′)
= inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EPφ(X +Hgτ |ω′α)
= inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EP [φ(X +H
g
τ+1 |ω′α) + g(ω′)>(S(ω′α)− S(ω′))]
≤ inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EP [φ∗(X |ω′α) + g(ω′)>(S(ω′α)− S(ω′))]
≤ sup
γ∈G
inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EP [φ∗(X |ω′α) + γ>(S(ω′α)− S(ω′))]
= inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EP [φg
∗
(X |ω′α) + (g∗(ω′))>(S(ω′α)− S(ω′))]
= inf
P∈Ps(ω′)
EPφ(X +Hg
∗
τ |ω′α)
= φg
∗
(X |ω′).
This completes the induction step. The statement of the theorem follows.
Proof of Prop. 3.5
We show how this proposition can be seen as a special case of Prop. 20 in Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2002a). Acceptability measures can be represented by penalty functions, as follows. Let
L0(Ω) denote the space of probability measures on Ω. The penalty function α : L0(Ω)→ R∪
{∞}, defined by α(P) = 0 if P ∈ P, else α(P) =∞, represents φP = infP∈L0(Ω)EP[·]+α(P ).
The minimal penalty function α0 is the penalty function of the closed convex hull of P; this
induces the same acceptability measure as P itself does (cf. Prop. 7 in the cited paper).
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Applying Prop. 20 (all conditions are satisfied) with α00 equal to the penalty function of
the closed convex hull of P now yields that φ∗ = (φP)∗ = infP∈L0(Ω)EP[·] + α(P) + αG(P)
with αG : L0(Ω) → R ∪ {∞} defined by αG(P) := supg∈GEP[Hg], cf. also Prop. 4.50 in
Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002c). For a linear hedge set this amounts to αG(P) = 0 if P ∈ P0,
and otherwise αG(P) =∞. The result follows.
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